Co-written with Lucy Powell

After a two-day NTSB investigative hearing on Capitol Hill, Boeing said it would redesign its 737 MAX aircraft to prevent more plug door blowouts.

The hearing, held between 6 and 7 August, was scheduled to determine the cause of the Alaska Airlines plug door blowout accident and to determine how Boeing could prevent further occurrences.

The hearing comes in the wake of criticisms surrounding Boeing and Spirit AeroSystems, Boeing’s aerostructure supplier, its senior leadership, and workplace due to several previous issues with its commercial aircraft.

Over the course of the two days, many discussions stemmed from the recent release of Boeing’s Safety and Quality plan, a detailed document that outlined all the changes the company aims to implement to ensure minimal risks during and after aircraft production.

On day one of the hearing, Elizabeth Lund, Senior Vice President of Quality for Boeing Commercial, said: “Since the accident […], we have established a set of six Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) that we are using to roll up and indicate a healthy factory. […] Our agreement with the FAA is going forward. These six KPIs and our performance to those control limits will also be a part of this rate readiness process.”

A main announcement to arise during the hearing was Boeing’s intention to redesign certain aspects of the 737 MAX-9 aircraft, to prevent this specific issue from happening again. This pairs with the current restrictions placed on Boeing, prohibiting it from increasing production of the 737 MAX-9, implemented by the FAA in January 2024.

Lund stated: “The design changes will ensure that the door plug cannot be closed if there are any issues until it is securely fastened.”

Cultural and workplace issues

However, the hearing has highlighted other issues for the manufacturer, such as problems surrounding workplace culture, safety culture, documentation, communication between teams, and worker treatment.

Lund combatted some of these allegations and added that, since January, Boeing had hired dedicated coaches to help improve quality control and provide oversight and support for mechanics and inspectors: “Since the time of the accident, we’ve hired an additional 160 workplace coaches. We now have over 250 across our programs.”

Complaints regarding overtime, long hours, pressure from superiors, and valuing time efficiency over thoroughness have been flagged up, and Jennifer Homendy, Chair of the NTSB, was firm with her views on the negative connotations of Boeing sidelining two workers involved with the plug door.

In conversation with Lloyd Catlin, a representative for the International Association of Machinists – a body which represents thousands of Boeing employees – Homendy said: “What message does that [sending two workers to ‘Boeing Prison’] send to the entire workforce?”

Catlin responded: “You mess up, you get moved. We see it all the time.”

Homendy was equally strict with the witnesses and their choice of words when being questioned. “This isn’t a PR campaign for Boeing. What I want to know is what happened in March, April, May, June, July, August, September, leading up to this, to what happened in January. […] What was going on then?”

Ultimately, the hearing was not conclusive as to why the incident occurred and at what point in the process the error was made, particularly given the critical factor of a lack of documentation regarding the removal of the plug door prior to the incident.

Photo: Boeing